“Yeh bhi toh Morbi ka hai.” It is a familiar objection at a tile counter, and this year it has become much easier for a customer to make.
On its Q2 FY27 earnings call on 26 October, Kajaria Ceramics said it expects to sell about 130 million square metres of tile this year, of which roughly 42 million – close to a third – will be outsourced from Morbi. On the same call, management said the price gap between its north and south plants and Morbi players has narrowed from about 40% to 20-25%.
So the gap is smaller, and a third of the market leader’s volume comes from the cluster it is being compared against. What exactly is the customer paying the difference for?
It is a fair question, and before answering it there is something worth establishing. Kajaria is not unusual in sourcing outside its own plants. What is unusual is how precisely it quantifies the arrangement: a stated volume, a named cluster, on a public call. Asian Granito also names third-party manufacturers in Morbi, but does not disclose what share of its tile volume is specifically outsourced from those manufacturers.
What the companies say about their own supply
Read the investor documents of India’s branded tile manufacturers and a more complicated picture emerges than the usual split between a branded tile and a Morbi tile. These four describe several different arrangements: volume outsourced from the cluster, capacity at associate entities, dedicated outsourcing tie-ups, and third-party manufacturers producing to a brand’s own designs and specifications.
The figures and arrangements below come from company disclosures. The final column is our account of what each disclosure does not establish.
| Company | What the company’s own document says | What it does not establish |
|---|---|---|
| Kajaria Ceramics Q2 FY27 earnings call, 26 Oct 2026 | Expects to sell about 130 million sq m this year, of which roughly 42 million is outsourced from Morbi – close to a third. Also operates its own plant in the cluster. | That any particular product, or any particular category, is made in Morbi. |
| Orient Bell Q4 FY26 investor presentation | “42.4 Million sqmt Annual Capacity (including AE*)”, where AE means associate entities. Locations listed: Sikandrabad 14.8, Hoskote 6.6, Dora 5.5 and Morbi 15.5 MSM. The presentation describes three own facilities and two associate-entity facilities across the listed locations. | That the Morbi capacity is third-party outsourcing. An associate entity is a defined corporate relationship, not a purchase from an independent unit. |
| Somany Ceramics Q1 FY27 investor update, 12 Aug 2026 | Tile capacity of about 80 million sq m a year, including dedicated outsourcing tie-ups. Sales mix: own manufacturing 34%, JVs 34%, Others 32%. Q1 tile production of 10.99 million sq m, split between own plants at 6.21 million and JVs at 4.78 million. | Where the outsourcing tie-ups are, or what “Others” consists of. Neither is identified as Morbi, and the category should not be read as an outsourcing share. |
| Asian Granito India FY2025-26 annual report | Third-party manufacturers in Morbi produce to AGL’s designs, specifications and digital-printing standards. Trading and outsourcing together account for 30-35% of tile volume. | That 30-35% of tile volume is outsourced from Morbi. The figure combines trading with outsourcing and the report does not split the two. |
Three of those lines repay a closer look.
Orient Bell’s own presentation puts its annual capacity at 42.4 million square metres and tells you, in a footnote, that the figure includes associate entities. Add up the plants it lists and its three own facilities come to 26.9 million square metres. The remaining 15.5 million is at Morbi, through associate entities – which makes Morbi the single largest location in the company’s stated capacity, larger than its own flagship plant at Sikandrabad.
Somany’s Q1 FY27 investor update, filed on 12 August 2026, does something similar from the other end. Its headline tile capacity of about 80 million square metres is stated as including dedicated outsourcing tie-ups – the company’s own phrase – while its sanitaryware and bath fittings capacities are stated as excluding them. Its sales mix lists own manufacturing at 34%, joint ventures at 34% and “Others” at 32%, against quarterly tile production of 10.99 million square metres which the same update splits between own plants at 6.21 million and JVs at 4.78 million. Those are different measures and should not be read across one another. Somany does not say where “Others” is made, nor whether the mix is by value or volume, and we are not going to guess at either.
Its Q1 FY27 earnings call records a separate discussion of Morbi outsourcing partners. That establishes a sourcing relationship with the cluster. It does not put a number on it.
Asian Granito’s FY2025-26 annual report is the most explicit of the four about the operating model. It says third-party manufacturers in Morbi produce to AGL’s designs, specifications and digital-printing standards – not merely that volume is bought in, but that the brand’s own design and printing standards travel to somebody else’s line. It also says trading and outsourcing together account for 30-35% of tile volume. That combined figure cannot be read as a Morbi share, because it bundles traded goods in with outsourced production and the report does not separate them. The company’s chairman’s message carries the same framing more briefly, giving a daily capacity of about 100,000 square metres “including outsourcing”.
The differences between these four matter and should not be flattened. Kajaria gives an expected volume outsourced from Morbi. Orient Bell identifies capacity at associate entities, Morbi among them. Somany reports dedicated outsourcing tie-ups and separately discusses Morbi partners on its call. Asian Granito names third-party manufacturers in Morbi, while combining trading with outsourcing in the share it reports.
These are four different measures and they do not permit a like-for-like ranking of how dependent each company is on outside production. Anyone lining up 42 million, 15.5 million, 32% and 30-35% as though they were comparable is making a chart, not an argument.
What they do have in common is the thing a customer at a counter is really asking about. In none of these four cases does the brand name tell you that the tile came out of a plant the company owns outright. A salesperson who argues that it must is arguing against his own principal’s investor documents.
What “outsourced” does and does not mean
Placing volume outside your own plants is long-standing practice. It avoids building and running a kiln for every size and finish a brand wants to sell, and gives access to ranges a company does not make itself. Whether it works out cheaper in any particular case depends on the contract, the specification, and what it costs to control quality and move the goods. What the recent disclosures add is a number against several different versions of that relationship.
Outsourcing is also not relabelling. In principle, a branded manufacturer places volume against a defined specification – body composition, size and thickness tolerance, surface finish, sorting standard – and inspects or rejects product that does not conform. The tile may be made on somebody else’s line. It is not necessarily the tile that line makes for its own account.
That distinction matters, and so does its limit. From outside the transaction, nobody can see a manufacturer’s specification, its rejection rate, or how tightly either is enforced. What can be said is narrow and should be said plainly: a shared factory does not establish a shared product, and it does not establish a different one either. Anyone claiming certainty in either direction – that outsourced branded tile is identical to cluster tile, or that it is categorically superior – is asserting something they cannot see.
It is also worth saying clearly, because the trade sometimes forgets it, that a cluster’s capability is not the issue. The question is never whether Morbi can make good tile. It is the specification and the quality control on the particular product being compared, and what surrounds the purchase. That a tile was made in Morbi, or made outside a brand’s own plant, does not settle that question either way.
What the premium may be buying beyond the tile
Consider what can actually be established about a branded purchase and a cluster purchase, once the tile itself is set aside.
Consistency across orders, not within one. Any single purchase can be consistent. One pallet from one firing, bought at one time, will generally match itself. The expensive failure is the second order. A project needs another 400 square feet six months after the first delivery – a bathroom added, a floor extended, breakage during handover, a section that has to come up. A line that remains available, with consistent specifications and batch control behind it, is more likely to be matched – though a catalogue entry on its own establishes none of those things. A design that ran for one season may not exist in any form by then, and a close substitute laid next to the original is visible to everyone who walks on it.
This can be a costly thing to get wrong, and it is almost never priced into the comparison a customer makes at the point of sale, because at the point of sale there is only one order.
Recourse when a floor fails. Most tile does not fail. When it does – crazing in the second year, warping in a large-format line, a body defect that only shows under load – the practical questions are who handles the claim, what remedy the written warranty provides, and what it excludes. Replacement tiles do not automatically mean compensation for lifting the original floor, for labour, or for reinstatement. Beyond the document sits the question of whether the counterparty will still be trading in three years and can honour what it promised. That is a question about the supplier rather than the tile, and it is a real part of what the premium is for. It is also where sellers overpromise, so anyone quoting the premium on the strength of a warranty should know what their own document says about removal and relaying.
The part the price comparison hides entirely. Depending on the supplier and the relationship, credit periods, returns, breakage allowances, schemes and the allocation of inventory risk can all differ. For a dealer, that difference is working capital, and working capital has a cost that does not appear anywhere in the per-square-foot comparison. Our piece on what normal credit terms look like in this trade covers that ground. Two cautions: these terms vary by manufacturer, dealer, volume and relationship rather than splitting neatly along branded and unbranded lines, and better terms for a dealer are not automatically a benefit to the customer. Presenting them as one is the sort of thing an experienced buyer notices.
What the premium does not buy
A sales argument that overclaims collapses the first time a customer tests it, so this part matters as much as the last.
A trade name does not, by itself, place a tile in a different technical class. Whether a given tile suits a given application is a question about that tile’s declared specification and its intended use, and the brand on the box does not answer it. Our guide to what a vitrified tile actually is goes through the axes that decide it. A salesperson who implies the brand settles the question is setting up an argument they will lose with any customer who reads a spec sheet.
Nor does the premium buy insulation from the cluster’s economics. Kajaria’s chairman Ashok Kajaria said on the October call that Morbi’s price increases applied to the company’s own Morbi plant and to its outsourced Morbi production as well. A branded manufacturer with volume in the cluster is exposed to cluster-level price movements like anyone else with volume there.
It does not buy immunity from the shade problem either. A supplier with effective batch tracking and dependable repeat-order availability may reduce that risk – but that is a property of the supplier’s systems rather than of the name on the box, and it does not remove the risk. A branded line can be discontinued too.
And the premium is not uniform. A manufacturer selling both own-made and outsourced product runs two cost structures underneath one price list. The 20-25% is one company’s account of its own position against cluster product on one earnings call – not a measured market-wide premium, and not a figure that transfers to every branded manufacturer.
Finally, the premium does not make the cluster alternative a bad purchase. On a great many jobs it is the right purchase. Which brings us to the part of this that is actually useful.
Why the question is being asked now
At a 40% difference, a branded line and a cluster line were easier to keep in separate conversations. At 20-25% the comparison is harder to avoid, and a customer can reasonably ask what the remaining difference buys.
Here is the uncomfortable part for anyone selling a brand. Kajaria’s management attributes the narrowing to prices in Morbi rising faster than prices at its own north and south plants. It put its own increases at roughly 12-13% at those plants. On Morbi it gave two figures from two people: chief financial officer Sanjeev Agarwal cited an increase of 18-19% across product verticals since gas prices rose, while Ashok Kajaria later described Morbi increases of 35-40% since late February, attributing them to higher gas costs. The call did not reconcile the two, and neither will we. What it establishes is that the gap narrowed and that management puts the cause on the Morbi side of the comparison. It does not establish that what a brand supplies got better, or that it did not.
Which means the easier price comparison a branded seller is enjoying this season rests largely on movements outside the brand’s control. Kajaria did raise its own prices, by roughly 12-13% at the north and south plants; on management’s account the gap narrowed because Morbi’s increases were larger still. When we wrote earlier this month that the branded-to-Morbi price gap had narrowed, no figure was on the public record and we declined to invent one. There is a figure now, and it rests on the same reversible condition: if fuel costs ease and the cluster reprices downward, the gap reopens and the objection comes back harder, because the customer will remember the narrower number.
The right response to a temporarily favourable price comparison is not to lean on it. It is to use the window to establish the non-price argument properly, with customers who are, for now, less likely to walk out over the difference.
When the premium is easy to justify, and when it is not
The honest answer to “is it worth paying more” is that it depends on the job, and a salesperson who can say which jobs is more credible than one who says every job.
| The premium is harder to justify when… | The premium is easier to justify when… |
|---|---|
| The whole quantity is bought at once and the job finishes in one go | The job runs in phases, or a later handover will need more of the same tile |
| It is a small, visually self-contained area | It is a large continuous floor where a shade break would be obvious |
| The owner expects to hold the property briefly and a later mismatch carries little consequence | The buyer is laying a floor they intend to live with for a decade or more |
| Lifting and relaying would be cheap and quick if it came to it | A redo means lost trading days, or lifting tile out of a finished space |
| The customer is buying a commodity size in a standard finish | The specification is unusual enough that a substitute would not match |
A framework for the counter conversation, not a rule. The judgement is CeramicPost’s.
Note what the right-hand column has in common. Every entry is about the cost of being wrong later, rather than about the tile being better now. That is one of the strongest cases for a premium: it is about reducing the cost and risk of problems afterwards. How much that protection is worth depends on the job, and on what the supplier has actually committed to.
How to have the conversation
When a customer raises the factory question, the move that works is to acknowledge what is actually known and then change what is being compared.
What is known, from the companies themselves, is that branded manufacturers use several supply arrangements beyond their own plants. The documents measure those arrangements differently, and none establishes the source of every tile sold under the brand. What is not known, in most transactions, is whether the branded tile on the counter and the cheaper alternative beside it came off the same line. Claiming they did without establishing it costs the same credibility as denying the sourcing altogether.
Then move the comparison from the tile to the floor. The tile is one line in the installed cost of a finished floor, alongside the adhesive, the labour, and the cost of doing the job twice. A 20-25% price gap on the tile will generally translate into a smaller percentage gap in the total installed cost, once adhesive and labour are included. Whether what remains is worth paying depends on the job – the area, the labour rate, and what a redo would actually involve – and that is a sum the customer can do with his own numbers, which is far more persuasive than being told a figure.
Then ask the three questions that actually decide it. Is this the whole quantity, or will more be needed later? If a section had to come up in two years, who pays for the labour? And is this a floor they will be looking at for a decade, or for eighteen months?
Those questions do two things. They move the conversation to ground where the premium means something. And on the jobs where the honest answer is that the premium is not worth paying, they let a salesperson say so – which is among the most valuable things they can do for a customer who will be back.
The numbers now on the record do not weaken the case for branded tile. They clarify where the case has to rest. The strongest argument for a premium was never that the brand owns the kiln – by these companies’ own accounts, it does not always. It is about who stands behind the tile when something goes wrong, and whether the same product can be bought again. Those are worth money on some jobs and not on others, and a trade that can tell the difference will sell more than one that insists on the difference everywhere.
Sources and notes: Kajaria’s figures are from its Q2 FY27 earnings call of 26 October 2026, as reflected in published transcripts of that call. Orient Bell’s are from its Q4 FY26 investor presentation. Somany’s capacity, production and sales-mix figures are from its Q1 FY27 investor update filed on 12 August 2026, with the Morbi relationship discussed separately on its Q1 FY27 earnings call. Asian Granito’s disclosures on third-party manufacturers in Morbi and on its combined trading-and-outsourcing share are from its FY2025-26 annual report. The arithmetic on Orient Bell’s own-plant capacity and on Kajaria’s outsourced share of about a third is CeramicPost’s calculation from the stated figures. These disclosures use different bases and should not be treated as directly comparable. The judgements about channel practice are ours.
