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Sept 2026
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Market Intelligence

Morbi Is Building in Andhra Too

By CeramicPost Editorial Team · 9 min read · October 18, 2026 Distributors & DealersTiles & Ceramics

When we mapped the shifting geography of India’s ceramic manufacturing earlier this year, the evidence was all from one half of the industry: listed, branded manufacturers building closer to their markets while still leaning on Morbi’s ecosystem underneath. The question that article could not answer was what the other half was doing – the unlisted, Morbi-native manufacturers who are not obliged to tell anyone anything.

Simpolo answered it on 30 September, in a release that was mostly about new product collections and an entry into faucets. Buried in it were two plants: ₹770 crore at Maliya in Gujarat, and ₹380 crore at Naidupeta in Andhra Pradesh. Same company, same programme, and the one in Gujarat is the bigger of the two by a factor of two.

That ratio is the story, and it argues against the simple migration narrative.

What was built, and where

The investment and capacity figures come from the company’s own announcement. Both plants are described in terms of a first phase.

Maliya, GujaratNaidupeta, Andhra Pradesh
Investment₹770 crore₹380 crore
Phase 1 rated capacity45,000 sq m per day25,000 sq m per day
Automated packing capacity43,000 sq m per day22,000 sq m per day
Production beganMay 2026November 2025

The machinery tells you what each plant is for. Maliya has two SACMI Continua+ PCR 2180 presses, which is slab and large-format equipment. Naidupeta has a 296-metre roller kiln and a polishing line with 74 polishing heads and 36 nano heads, a configuration built for polished vitrified at volume.

The dates in that last row are not Simpolo’s. They come from CRISIL’s rating rationale of 28 May 2026, which states that “the Tirupati plant became operational from November 2025 and Malya plant has recently become operational from May 2026.” The same document carries the identical daily capacities, 25,000 and 45,000 square metres, and puts the group’s recent spending at “around Rs 1,150 crore in recent two years” – which is ₹770 crore and ₹380 crore added together. It is third-party reporting of the timeline rather than an audit of it; CRISIL states that it “does not perform an audit or undertake due diligence or independent verification.”

Taken with that caveat, this is not an announcement of intent. Both plants were producing before Simpolo’s September release described them, one of them since late 2025.

What neither source publishes is plant-level output. CRISIL identifies timely utilisation ramp-up at the new plants as a monitorable and slow ramp-up as a downside risk, and discloses no plant-level utilisation for either. It also records that the Tirupati plant “was shut for two months (from end of March to end of May), driven by gas supply issues” and had recently restarted. The one utilisation figure it gives – capacities “running at 70% at Morbi location” – is for the group’s existing Morbi operations and is not a figure for either new plant. Rated capacity is not what left the door, and the gap between them is undisclosed.

The bigger plant is the one in Gujarat

This is what undoes the migration story, and it does not require any interpretation. Of the ₹1,150 crore announced across the two sites, ₹770 crore is allocated to Gujarat. Whatever Simpolo is doing in Andhra Pradesh, the commitment at home is roughly twice the size.

The geography sharpens it, and it is the company’s own geography rather than our reading. The September release names the site only as “Maliya, Gujarat”, but Simpolo’s 2024 announcement of the same plant placed it at “Malia, Morbi, Gujarat”, on about 86 acres. So the larger investment is not merely in the same state as the cluster. It is in Morbi.

Morbi is building in Andhra, and Morbi is also building in Morbi. That reframes what we wrote about how India’s ceramic manufacturing map is changing. The southward move is not a branded-sector manoeuvre to escape the cluster and its economics. It is something the cluster’s own manufacturers are doing, while expanding at home in parallel. Southern capacity is being added to Morbi’s, not substituted for it.

What the daily numbers mean annually

The trade talks in annual square metres and both the release and the rating rationale give daily rated capacity. Converting between the two needs an operating-days assumption, so here is ours with the assumption stated.

On an assumed 330 operating days a year, 45,000 square metres a day at Maliya is roughly 15 million square metres, and 25,000 a day at Naidupeta is roughly 8.3 million. That is our arithmetic, not anyone’s disclosure – the daily number is published, the operating days are not. At 300 days the same plants come out at roughly 13.5 million and 7.5 million, a swing of more than a million square metres, which is why the assumption belongs in the sentence rather than buried under it.

One detail repays attention. At both plants, automated packing is rated below production – 43,000 against 45,000 at Maliya, 22,000 against 25,000 at Naidupeta. That difference does not on its own establish a bottleneck, which would depend on operating hours, accumulation and handling, and actual production. It is a detail worth noticing in a release otherwise built around pressing capacity.

Reconciling the Simpolo numbers

Two sets of figures for the Andhra plant have been circulating that would not sit together, and we have previously published the lower one with a note that we could not resolve the gap. The company’s 2024 announcement explains both.

That announcement set out a plan to spend over ₹1,000 crore across two to three years and triple existing capacity. It named the same two sites: Malia at ₹650 crore, and Naidupeta at over ₹350 crore, where capacity was “planned to reach 13.2 million square meters per annum over the next two years.”

So 13.2 million was never a claim about first-phase capacity, and it never contradicted the September release. It was the planned build-out target for the Andhra plant, set in 2024 for the two years following. Against that target, the disclosed first-phase rating of 25,000 square metres a day annualises to roughly 8.3 million on our 330-day assumption, or about 62 per cent of it. Anyone who has seen 13.2 quoted as Naidupeta’s installed capacity has seen a target described as a fact.

The rest follows from the same document. “Over ₹350 crore” in 2024 against ₹380 crore in 2026 is one commitment stated loosely and then precisely, not a revision. Maliya’s announced investment rose further, from ₹650 crore to ₹770 crore, and the programme total from about ₹1,000 crore to ₹1,150 crore. CRISIL separately reports ₹170 to ₹180 crore of cost escalation met without additional debt – a related figure, but not the arithmetic difference between two rounded totals. The chairman’s April 2025 description of Naidupeta as around $40 million and 8.5 million square metres is broadly consistent with the first-phase figures – ₹380 crore was about $44 million at the rate then prevailing, and 8.5 million sits close to our 8.3 million. But that volume comparison rests on our own operating-days assumption, and nothing in either statement establishes that the two use the same definition of capacity.

The figures reconcile. The only assumption still ours is the operating days.

What a second southern base changes at the counter

For a dealer in Hyderabad, Chennai or Bengaluru, the interesting part is not the investment figure. It is that one manufacturer has had a southern production base since November 2025, with a two-month interruption this year.

Naidupeta sits in southern Andhra Pradesh, close to the Tamil Nadu border and the Chennai corridor. Three things could change for southern buyers, if the ranges they sell are supplied from there rather than from Saurashtra:

  • Freight. Tiles are heavy and cheap per kilo, which makes road freight a real share of landed cost rather than a rounding error. What any individual buyer saves still depends on his location and where his particular range is made.
  • Lead time. How long replenishment takes is what decides the buffer stock a dealer has to carry. If the southern plant can resupply the relevant range faster and more predictably, that buffer can be smaller and less working capital sits in it, which is often worth more than a small discount. It turns on real delivery performance, not distance on a map.
  • A second source for the same product. If a shade or size can be made at either plant, the second location becomes an alternative when one is disrupted – and Naidupeta’s two-month interruption is a reminder that production can stop even at a new facility. Whether it helps depends on how product is allocated between the sites and whether there is spare capacity at the time.

The useful question has changed shape. Not whether there is a southern plant or when it starts, which are settled, but which part of the range actually comes out of Naidupeta, whether it is reaching dealers in your market, and at what quantity. The equipment points at polished vitrified there and large format at Maliya; nothing published says how allocation works between them. That is a fair thing to ask of a supplier whose southern plant has been running, on and off, for the best part of a year.

There is a wider timing question too. Simpolo’s ₹1,150 crore expansion came on stream during a sharp contraction in India’s tile exports: our monthly export data records 100.1 million square metres shipped over April to July, down 46.4 per cent year on year, with April much the worst of the four months. That does not mean the new output is destined for the domestic market, and exports have not stopped. So this is a smaller export market rather than a closed one, and Simpolo has not said where the new production goes. The open question is how much of the capacity being added across the industry gets absorbed at home and how much goes back out. Dealers may see part of that in who turns up asking for shelf space, though nobody is obliged to publish the split.

Three things this is not

It is not a capacity comparison with the listed players. Simpolo has published rated first-phase capacity per day; Kajaria reports annual consolidated sales volume across owned plants, joint ventures and outsourced supply. Side by side those numbers would look precise and mean very little.

It is not a migration. On the figures both the company and its rating agency have put on the record, twice as much of Simpolo’s money went into Gujarat as into Andhra Pradesh. The cluster is not being vacated by the people who built it.

And a plant is not an ecosystem. What makes Morbi hard to replace was never kiln capacity, which can be built anywhere with land, power and a gas connection. It is the density around the kilns: glaze and ink suppliers, machinery and service firms, body-clay traders, and a labour pool that has done this work for a generation. A plant in Andhra Pradesh buys proximity to a market; it does not reproduce that. Nor does a southern address remove exposure to gas supply: Naidupeta lost two months to a gas-supply interruption this year. Whether that had anything to do with the conditions in Morbi is not something the record says. Proximity to a market is not the same as reliable supply to it. Whether such depth builds up around the southern plants over time is a question for the next decade, and two factories cannot answer it. What they do show is that for this manufacturer, adding a southern base has not meant leaving the cluster behind.

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